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• Discussion of peculiarly grid regulation issues
• A quick stock take of the state of “onr market”: particularly concerning 
the interisland link
• Competition and pricing the HVDC interconnection
Outline
• Has the function of transporting (large amounts of) electricity
• Has the characteristics of
– Very large long-lived investments that are sunk
– Uncertainty represented by changes of demand and generation in total and at 
locations
– Poorly defined property rights rendering external effects 
• In most jurisdictions there is a grid and it is regarded as a natural 
monopoly although it has competition from
– Generation locating next to populations
– Gas pipelines & discoveries
The Grid
• While the grid does not generate electricity it 
– Affects costs by affecting energy losses and congestion
– Affects the availability of energy to any location by capacity provided 
for transport
– Provides generator options to utilise a range of fuel sources 
• The Grid and Generation are both
– Substitutes for each other
– Complements with each other
• There is thus a game about whether to expand the grid, transport of 
other fuels, and/or invest in generation at particular locations. These may 
all (more or less) be sources of competition at a location
The Grid-Generator Game
• The grid becomes a leader in the game: one that anticipates other 
players’ strategies that in turn anticipate the grid’s strategies   
• It has the effect of changing the game, arguably, to one of commitment 
to grid plans that reduces uncertainty and risk leading to a more 
coordinated outcome of the grid-generator game, albeit one where the 
grid is the first mover (RMA willing).
• The grid provides the platform for loads and generators to transact
• We have three regulatory mechanisms: an efficiency objective for the 
grid owner, the EC and  the CC
Regulation By A Standalone Body Changes The 
Game
Grid Connection: the HVDC
• The HVDC is an inter-connector between two markets 
managed by the grid owner
• Charged to the South Island generators as a
• fixed sum based on the ODV of the HVDC;  less
• loss and constraint rentals given by
|Pni - Psi|*MWH trans-shipped (North or South)
Pni will differ from  Psi only if there is congestion on the link
• Allocated among SI generators on the basis of highest grid 
injection over recent a defined period. New SI entrants 
draw a charge 
Consumer-Producer Gain from Trade in 
Electrical Energy
(North Flow)
psi
pni
SI Market NI Market National Market
MWHsi MWHni Aggregate MWH
Energy: South to North or North to South
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Rentals have reduced 
the HVDC Charge by 
roughly 16% over 
2003-2007.
Range
5.8% - 31%
The higher figures with 
higher flows 
Benefits From The HVDC Connection
• There are national efficiency gains from South to 
North flow as well
• Energy MWH is not the only benefit: capacity (MW) is 
a benefit too since it provides access to (responsive 
hydro) reserves. [the HVDC can be a reserve risk 
too]
• Other benefits include competition in one market 
The role of One Market
• At least between 1996 and 2004 there was “one market” to 
a close approximation (Evans, Guthrie and Videbeck)
• Facilitates coordination/substitution of fuels with particular 
characteristics via a national electricity market
• One market means that
• Load pockets are circumscribed in extent and over time
• Contracts across nodes can be “confidently” entered 
into; and
• Some reliance can be placed on reserves across the 
country (national market)
One Market and Market Power
• One market mitigates market power:
• forward contracts and vertical integration reduce 
dependence on the spot market;
• contracts across nodes reduce dependence on the spot 
market
• reducing load pockets reduces market power in the spot 
and contract markets
• With one national market competition is determined by the 
diversity and number of suppliers and the responsiveness 
of demanders
The State of One Market 
The possibility of “one” market is reduced by the de-
commissioning of pole 1 (at least 30% the HVDC MW 
capacity).
Even if, as is planned, capacity is increased by 1/2 pole.  
Although addition will be useful for NI reserves purposes. 
Pricing the HVDC
The interconnection contract produces a 
nationwide “transaction” platform. So 
does literature on transactions platform 
prices inform us about the nature of the 
contract? Is there a two sided market?
Pricing the HVDC The Present Situation
• South Island generators are charged for the total 
ODV cost of the link;
• Both consumers and producers are net beneficiaries
(percentages are qualitative indicators only)
– Consumers (80% NI  20% SI) energy
– Producers (20% NI and 80% SI) energy and reserves
• Conclusion: it is not user pays pricing
Pricing the HVDC: Static Efficiency I
Efficiency is determined by decisions taken given plant 
in place
In the short term the fixed charge is a lump sum tax on 
SI generators and will not materially affect behaviour
Although the loss and constraint rentals are variable in 
the short-run; they are largely out of the control of SI 
generators
Suggests not much static inefficiency
Pricing the HVDC: Static Efficiency II
The NI price > SI price affects SI generators in two ways
Providing loss and constraint rentals:
Selling in the SI spot market at a lower price than it pays for energy 
purchased (net of SI owned contracted NI generation) for resale in 
the NI
(actual position will be affected by hedges and volatility of the price 
separation) 
Suggesting reductions in participation in the NI (SI)market by SI (NI) 
gentailers => reduced competition in that market
This result stems from price separation rather than pricing. Decisions 
might be influenced by the loss and constraint rentals if they 
became significant 
Pricing the HVDC: Dynamic Efficiency
Dynamic efficiency is affected if the timing, amount, or location of 
investment are affected
The effect of charges on SI generators may well affect 
plant/entrant location decisions where the “fuel” benefit of 
location is not strong (locating in the NI instead, may not be 
closer to demand and may not provide desired reserve 
characteristics)
It would also be inefficient if it incentivised overt delays in 
investment (in the HVDC and in generation) as may be the case 
where SI generators had full control of the HVDC: they do not
Given that the benefits shared throughout the country: if location is 
affected by the HVDC charges it will not be dynamically efficient 
Pricing Variable or Fixed
The optimal charge for large sunk assets is typically a two part tariff 
approximating the cost structure: dynamically it may not be: 
particularly where the fixed cost is harder to identify with the
user than variable cost 
Lump-sum charges are not dynamically efficient where costly 
actions can be taken for avoidance
Variable (postage stamp) charges while not statically efficient may 
well be dynamically efficient as the user pays: again 
identification with actual “use” is a problem in a network (pool), 
and there is an issue about paying for capacity vs energy
Transaction Platform Economics
The HVDC joins two energy transaction platforms (NI and SI) 
Transaction platforms facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers
In the case 
• of no indirect interaction in demand it doesn’t matter much whether the 
transaction cost is paid by the buyer or seller: it is cost based (e.g. a 
universal postage stamp charge)
• Where there is interaction in demand tangential/external to the basic 
transaction the charge will be affected by demand and may efficiently 
differ between agents transacting.
External Effects: a) Fast-start reserve for NI generators: does reserve
pricing capture this?
b) competition for consumers
THE HVDC
• Is an interconnection between two markets and is critical for a 
national electricity market
• It is an integral part of the transaction platform that is the Grid 
and is managed as such: why should its pricing be so different?
• Has direct (energy) benefits consumers and producers 
nationwide
• Has indirect (reserve capacity) benefits
– in the NI market particularly
– competition effects for load
• Present pricing is not user-pay: some form of market wide user 
pay is almost certainly more dynamically efficient.

